Abstract. Given a set of p players we consider problems concerning envy-free allocation of collections of k pieces from a given set of goods or chores. We show that if p ≤ n and each player can choose k pieces out of n pieces of a cake, then there exist a division of the cake and an allocation of the pieces where at least p 2(k 2 −k+1) players get their desired k pieces each. We further show that if p ≤ k(n − 1) + 1 and each player can choose k pieces, one from each of k cakes that are divided into n pieces each, then there exist a division of the cakes and allocation of the pieces where at least p 2k(k−1) players get their desired k pieces. Finally we prove that if p ≥ k(n− 1)+ 1 and each player can choose one shift in each of k days that are partitioned into n shifts each, then, given that the salaries of the players are fixed, there exist n(1 + ln k) players covering all the shifts, and moreover, if k = 2 then n players suffice. Our proofs combine topological methods and theorems of Füredi, Lovász and Gallai from hypergraph theory.
Introduction
Consider a group of people who are interested in sharing a house and office space. Is there a way to allocate rent on the rooms of the house and office building in such a way that all of the rooms will be rented, and each renter will get their first choice of room in each building? And given an employer with a pool of potential workers, can they guarantee a small number of workers can be hired to cover all necessary shifts?
In this paper, we examine several fair division questions pertaining to the allocation of multiple pieces of goods (or bads) to players. Our goal will be to divide multiple goods fairly among a group of people: we seek to divide multiple cakes such that players receive one piece from each cake, we wish to assign shifts on multiple days to workers so that all shift are covered, and we seek to assign rents to rooms in multiple buildings so that players prefer disjoint rooms in each building. We also consider the problem of assigning multiple pieces of a single cake to players.
Since it is not always possible in these multi-piece allocation problems to make all players in an arbitrary group happy, our results assume a larger initial set of "potential players" and guarantee that some fraction of them can be satisfied with a distribution of pieces. In all of our problems, we seek to allocate pieces to players in such a way that they each receive their most preferred set of pieces in a given division, chosen over the set of all possible collections of pieces in that division. This makes the allocation envy-free, as the player would not wish to trade pieces with any other player. It also makes the allocation Paretooptimal, as no shuffling of the pieces among players would make any of the players happier (as they all have their top choice of pieces).
The problem of dividing a single cake among a group of players has been extensively studied (see, e.g. [2, 16] ). More recently, the division of multiple goods or bads has been examined. Cloutier, et.al. [3] showed that when dividing two cakes into two pieces each, it is not always possible to satisfy the preferences of the two players if each of them chooses one piece of each cake. However, if the number of players is increased, or the number of pieces is increased, then it can be guaranteed that there are two players whose choices of pieces in each cake are disjoint. Hence, both these players can be satisfied simultaneously. Note that in this problem, if the number of players is increased, or the number of pieces is increased (but both are not increased together), then there is either a player who does not receive any cake, or a piece of cake that has not been distributed to any player. We can consider these "left out" players or pieces as being the price of a disjoint, envyfree distribution of cake, as it may be impossible to satisfy two players otherwise.
Lebert et. al. [13] extended the work in [3] to show an upper bound on the number of pieces necessary to guarantee that m cakes can be divided in an envy-free manner among two players. Here again, each of the two players receives a disjoint, envy-free set of pieces of the cakes, but there are extra pieces not allocated to any player.
Dual to the notion of dividing goods, one can ask about dividing "bads", or chores, which leads to the problem of rental division. In [18] , Su showed that a division of rent among rooms in a house can be achieved so that each roommate prefers a different room. In a surprising result, Frick et. al. [6] show that an envy-free rent division can be achieved among n people, even if the preferences of only n − 1 housemates are known.
However, when we extend the question to division of rent in multiple houses (say a bedroom house and an office building that are being rented to a set of roommates together), then, as in the case of dividing multiple cakes, it may be impossible to make every player happy simultaneously. Already in the case of two players and two houses with two rooms each, an example where there is no envy-free division of the rent is known (see Theorem 3 of [3] ).
We now summarize our results. Our proofs are topological, and combine extensions of KKM-type theorems with tools from hypergraph theory.
Our first theorem gives a lower bound on the number of players who prefer mutually disjoint pieces in the case where one cake is divided into n pieces and players chooses k pieces each. We imagine a set of potential players who, when presented with some division of the cake, have a preferred set of k pieces. We strive for divisions in which we can maximize the number of players whose preferred k pieces are disjoint, since those players can be satisfied simultaneously. This theorem is proved in Section 4. Our second theorem involves dividing k cakes into n pieces each. We call a choice of one piece in each cake a k-piece selection. ⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint k-piece selections.
We prove this Theorem in Section 5. Our final fair division result gives conditions under which an employer can cover all necessary work shifts on k days with a small number of employees. In this scenario, an employer seeks to divide k work days into n shifts each in such a way that s/he is able to cover all of the shifts with a limited number of employees. We prove the following. This result is an extension of Theorem 1.5 of [1] which can be interpreted to define the preferences of potential employees more narrowly. There one imagines a scenario in which potential employees submit in advance a personal time schedule, consisting of one time interval per day, during which s/he is willing work. Our Theorem 1.3 generalizes this result to every model of employee shift preferences, where employee daily schedules are not necessarily single intervals, nor predetermined.
For the proof of Theorem 1.3 we prove a combinatorial dual extension of the topological KKMS theorem of Shapley [9] to products of simplices, where dualization happens in each factor. Let ∆ n−1 be the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex and let P (n, k) = (∆ n−1 ) k be the k(n − 1)-dimensional polytope obtained by taking the Cartesian product of k copies of ∆ n−1 . Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k). We say that a function ℓ :
Theorem 1.4. If T is a triangulation of P (n, k) with a factorwisedual-Sperner labeling ℓ, then it has an equivalent labeling ℓ ′ with an elementary simplex Q in T , such that the set of labels
Here "balanced" means that one can find non-negative weights on Λ(Q) such that the sum of weights in each component is 1. Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 are proved in Section 6.
A Corollary of Theorem 1.3 guarantees an envy-free way to rent out all of the rooms in two n-room buildings, given an adequate pool of potential renters. Consider a set of colleagues, each of whom prefers free rooms if available, has closed preference sets, and in any division of the rents finds a collection of two rooms, one in each building, acceptable. 
Preliminaries in hypergraph theory
A hypergraph is a pair H = (V, E) where V = V (H) is a vertex set, and E = E(H) is a finite collection of subsets of V called edges.
A 2-partite hypergraph is a bipartite graph. The rank of a hypergraph H = (V, E), denoted rank(H), is the maximum size of an edge in E, and the degree of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted deg(v), is the number of
A matching in a hypergraph H = (V, E) is a set of disjoint edges. The matching number ν(H) is the maximal size of a matching in H. A fractional matching of H is a function f : E → [0, 1], such that for every v ∈ V we have e:v∈e f (e) ≤ 1. We can think of f (e) as the weight of edge e in the formal sum e∈E f (e) · e, where at each vertex v, the sum of coefficient of edges containing v is at most 1. The fractional matching number of H is denoted by ν * (H) and is defined as
V is balanced with respect to a set V if the hypergraph H = (V, E) has a perfect fractional matching.
For example, consider the vertex set V = {1, 2, 3,1,2,3}, with edge set comprised of all pairs of vertices with one barred and one un-barred vertex. Then the edge set {e 1 = (11), e 2 = (21), e 3 = (12), e 4 = (22), e 5 = (33)} is balanced with respect to V since there are edge weights that sum to 1 at each vertex. In particular, A perfect fractional cover of H is a fractional cover with v:v∈e g(v) = 1 for every e ∈ E. By linear programming duality, we have
Since f (e) was counted |e| ≤ n times in (1) for every edge e ∈ E(H), we have that
If H is n-uniform, then the constant function g :
} is a fractional cover and therefore ν
. Combining with the inequality above, we have ν
We will use the following bounds on the ratio ν * /ν and τ /τ * :
The dual hypergraph H D = (U, F ) of a hypergraph H = (V, E) is obtained by reversing the roles of vertices and edges, namely, U = E, F = V , and an edge v ∈ F consists of all the vertices e ∈ U for which v ∈ e in H. If H is d-uniform then deg(e) = d for all e ∈ U and we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.3:
If H is a bipartite graph then the situation is even better: Proof. Let T be any triangulation of P . Then the first subdivision T ′ of T is a complete triangulation of P , with the assignment
is the barycenter of an (i − 1)-dimensional face of T .
Allocating multiple pieces of one cake to players
In this section, we consider dividing one cake into n pieces and assigning k pieces to each player. We imagine that our cake is rectangular, and is divided by parallel vertical cuts. We represent the division of the cake into n pieces by the n-tuple x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n ≥0 satisfying n i=1 x i = 1, where x i denotes the width of piece i. The space of all possible divisions of one cake into n pieces can therefore be realized by the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex ∆ n−1 .
The preferences of an individual player can be visualized as a covering of the space of divisions of the cake by sets corresponding to all possible collections of k pieces. Each point in the space is assigned to the set corresponding to the k pieces that the player would prefer if the cake were cut according to that division. We note that it is possible for a point to belong to multiple sets if the player is indifferent to more than one collection of k pieces in the given division.
We make the following natural assumptions on player preferences.
(1) The players are hungry: no player prefers an empty piece of cake to a non-empty piece. (2) The players have closed preference sets: if a player prefers a given set of k pieces in a sequence of divisions that approach a limit, then the player prefers that same set of k pieces in the cut corresponding to the limit of the sequence of divisions. For t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ R n define the support of t to be the set supp(t) = {i | t i = 0}. Our main tool in the proof of Theorem 1.1 is a generalization of Sperner's lemma, due to Shapley [9] , in which vertices have subsets of labels (rather than single labels): . Therefore, by Theorem 2.2,
We conclude that T contains a matching M ′ of size at least
, which corresponds to a subset M of vertices of Q.
We are now ready to prove our first main result which we restate. ⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint sets of k pieces.
Proof. Let S be the set of players with |S| = p. We duplicate each player ⌈ n p ⌉ times and choose a set S ′ of size n from the copies of players. By Lemma 3.1 there exists a complete triangulation T of ∆ n−1 . Let o v ∈ S ′ be the owner of v ∈ V (T ) in a complete assignment. 
, and if p divides n then this improves to |M| ≥
To show the existence of a single division of the cake that would satisfy at least m players, carry out the procedure above for a sequence of finer and finer complete triangulations T . By compactness of ∆ n−1 and decreasing size of the elementary simplices, there must exist a subsequence Q = Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . of elementary simplices converging to a single point, such that in each Q i there are at least m players of S that have pairwise disjoint k-piece selections. Since there are finitely many subsets of the player set S, and each player has a closed preference set, there must exists a subset N ⊂ S of players of size |N| = m for which the limit point of Q corresponds to a division of the cake in which the players in N are satisfied with different sets of k pieces.
Dividing multiple cakes
We now turn to the problem of dividing multiple cakes among a set of potential players. We will be dividing k cakes into n pieces each, and hence our space of all possible divisions will be realized by the k(n − 1)-dimensional polytope P (n, k) which is defined as the product of k simplices of dimension n − 1 each, that is,
Every face of P (n, k) is given by
, where ∆ S is the face of ∆ n−1 spanned by the vertices in S ⊂ [n].
The KKMS theorem is a continuous version of Theorem 4.1. A theorem of Komiya [8] implies the following generalization of the KKMS theorem to the polytope P (n, k):
Then there exists a balanced collection of tuples
Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then by the theorem, we obtain a k-partite hypergraph H on vertex set V = V 1 ⊔· · ·⊔V k with an edge set
that has a perfect fractional matching. Since every edge in I is of size k, by Lemma 2.1 we have that ν
. We conclude that I contains a matching M of size at least Proposition 5.3. Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k) with labeling ℓ : Proof. Let T ′ be the first barycentric subdivision of T . For every k-
k , we set V I = {v ∈ T | L(v) = I} and let B I be the union of all elementary simplices S of T ′ with V (S) ∩ V I = ∅. Then the sets B I satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5.2, so considering the conclusion, every point x ∈ m t=1 B I t lies in simplex of T that contains M in its vertex set.
We are now ready to prove our second main theorem: ⌉ players prefer mutually disjoint k-piece selections.
Proof. Let S be the set of players with |S| = p. As in the proof of Theorem 1.1, we duplicate each player ⌈ k(n−1)+1 p ⌉ times and choose a set S ′ of size k(n−1) + 1 from the copies of the players. By Lemma 3.1, there exists a complete triangulation T of the polytope P = P (n, k).
corresponds to a division of the k cakes into n pieces each. Define a labelling ℓ :
k by setting ℓ(v) to be the k-tuple representing the k-piece selection, one from each cake, that the player o v prefers. Since o v is hungry, we 
,
. A similar argument to the one made in the proof of Theorem 1.1 now shows the existence of a single cut of the k cakes into n pieces each that would satisfy at least
players in the case p divides k(n − 1) + 1.
We note that the techniques in this proof are similar to those used by Lebert, et. al. [13] to prove that if there are only two players then, for large enough n, there exists a division of the k cakes into n pieces each in which both players prefer pairwise disjoint k pieces, one from each cake.
Assigning Shifts to Players
Our last allocation problem involves an employer who wishes to assign all shifts on a set of days to a collection of employees. We look for a small set of employees who can cover all of the shifts. This would be a useful consideration if, for example, the employees were all receiving fixed salaries, and so the employer wishes to spend the least amount of money to cover all of the shifts. Moreover, it is natural to assume (and we will make this assumption) that if the salaries are fixed then every employee prefers an empty shift (a shift that requires no time at work), if one is available.
We also assume that if there are multiple empty shifts, then players are indifferent between them. This is actually a consequence of having closed preference sets, since the division with multiple empty shifts is the limit of divisions in which a single fixed room is free.
We call a choice of one shift on each of k days a k-shift selection.
We note that in a typical solution to our problem, more employees are needed than there are shifts each day. This indicates that some shifts will be covered by more than one employee, or some employees can be sent home early.
Consider a polytope P with a triangulation T . A labeling of T is said to be Sperner if the vertices of P have distinct labels, and vertices of T that lie on a minimal face F of P have labels chosen from the labels of the vertices of P spanning the face F . A simplex of T is said to be a full cell if its vertices have distinct labels. We will require the following result from [4] which comes from a generalization of Sperner's Lemma to polytopes. Each point in the product of simplices P (n, k) represents a division of k days into n shifts each. Let T be a triangulation of P (n, k). We shall label every vertex v = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) ∈ V (T ) (where v i ∈ ∆ n−1 ) with a k-tuple ℓ(v) = (ℓ 1 (v), . . . , ℓ k (v)) in [n] k that will represent a desirable shift selection for some player.
We now define a labeling condition to describe the fact that players prefer empty shifts when available. For any x ∈ ∆ n−1 , let empty(x) =
[n] \ supp(x). We say a labeling ℓ :
k is factorwise-dualSperner if whenever empty(v i ) = ∅, we have ℓ i (v) ∈ empty(v i ). Since players are indifferent between empty shifts when there are more than one, we define also a notion of equivalent labelings that allow for switching preferences between empty shifts. We say two factorwisedual-Sperner labelings ℓ, ℓ
For the proof of Theorem 1.3 we need a dual-Sperner-type result for P (n, k). This is Theorem 1.4 that we restate and prove here. For its proof we employ a technique used by Frick, et. al. [6] to give a Sperner labeling in their rental division problem with a secretive housemate.
Theorem 1.4
If T is a triangulation of P (n, k) with a factorwisedual-Sperner labeling ℓ, then it has an equivalent labeling ℓ ′ with an elementary simplex Q in T , such that the set of labels
Proof. We will construct an equivalent Sperner labeling ℓ ′ of T . First for any J ⊂ [n], let J + 1 denote the set {i + 1 | i ∈ J}, where for the purposes of this definition we set n + 1 = 1, so that J + 1 cycles the indices in J by shifting each by 1.
′ is a factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling that is equivalent to ℓ. We claim that ℓ ′ is a Sperner labeling of T . To prove this, we have to show that (a) the vertices of P (n, k) receive pairwise distinct labels in ℓ ′ , and (b) the label ℓ ′ (v) of v ∈ V (T ) matches one of the labels of the vertices of supp(v) in P (n, k). To see (a), observe that for any vertex w of P (n, k) and any i ∈ [k], the set J i = supp(w i ) is a singleton, and any two vertices of P (n, k) will differ in J i for at least one i. For (b), note that a point v ∈ P (n, k) is on a face spanned by a vertex w if and only if supp(w i ) ⊂ supp(v i ) for all i. Now, given v ∈ V (T ) let w = (w 1 , . . . , w k ) be the vertex of P (n, k) where supp(w i ) = {ℓ • |U| = n when k = 2, or and edges V has a cover of size t where t ≤ (1 + ln k)n, and moreover, t = n when k = 2. By the definition of H D , this means that there exists a set of vertices U ⊂ V (Q) of size |U| = t such that the set of labelings of U cover each v ∈ V . That is, for every j ∈ [k] and i ∈ V j = [n] there exists u ∈ U for which ℓ ′ j (u) = i. We now prove our last main theorem. Then there exists a partition of k days into n shifts each for which a subset of at most n(1+ln k) employees cover all the kn shifts. Moreover, if k = 2 there exists a subset of n employees that cover all the 2n shifts.
Proof. Fix a subset S of k(n − 1) + 1 players. By Lemma 3.1, there exists a complete triangulation T of P = P (n, k). Let o v ∈ S be the owner of v ∈ V (T ) in a complete assignment.
Every vertex v = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) ∈ V (T ) corresponds to an partition of the k days into n shifts each. Let the labeling ℓ(v) be the shift selection chosen by o v : one shift on each day. Since o v prefers empty shifts, for each j we have ℓ j (v) ∈ empty(v j ) whenever empty(v j ) = ∅. When more than one empty shift exists on a particular day, we can reassign the label for that day if needed, as in the proof of Theorem 1.4, to obtain a factorwise-dual-Sperner labeling ℓ ′ . Thus, by Proposition 6.2, there exists an elementary simplex Q in T and U ⊂ V (Q) of size |U| ≤ n(1 + ln k) (or |U| = n if k = 2), such that the set {ℓ ′ (u) | u ∈ U} has the property that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k] there exists u ∈ U for which ℓ ′ j (u) is i. This corresponds to a cover of the shifts. A similar argument to the one made in the proof of Theorem 1.2 now shows the existence of a single partition of the days into shifts in which the k-shift selection of at most of n(1 + ln k) employees (or n employees if k = 2) cover every shift.
